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CYBER SECURITY:
CHINA AND RUSSIA’S EROSION OF
21ST CENTURY UNITED STATES’ HEGEMONY
Cyril K. Yancey
Dr. Richard Stahler-Sholk, Mentor
ABSTRACT
With Russia and China emerging as challengers to
U.S. hegemony, the use of cyber warfare could tilt the current
balance of power in either of their favors. Using various methods,
hackers can acquire sensitive information and destroy online
infrastructures. In the development of cyber warfare, China has
become a seasoned veteran with computer virus operations dating
back to 199714. Russia has emerged as a cyber aggressor, as seen in
Russia’s cyber attacks on several countries in the last decade. This
paper argues that, with the growth of foreign cyber technology, the
probability of cyberspace being used as a military front by state or
non-state actors against the United States increases.
INTRODUCTION
International Power Measurements
The measure of power in international politics and state
relations refers to the range of influence any single actor has over
other actors on the world stage. In the international system, two
ways to measure state power are soft power and hard power. The
use of soft power in the international system allows a state to
influence other states and actors via trade relations and diplomatic
means. Hard power in the international system is based on
the ability for states to reach their goals using force, threats, or
coercive actions27. In the international system, the use of power by
various states creates a system of power relations between states.
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The levels of influence states and actors have over each other are
measured by their military capabilities, strategic relationships,
and economic performance. In competition between states for
power, competitors look for new ways to increase their power,
resulting in a search to find new means to keep pace with the
current world leader.
The role of a hegemon in world politics has been noted
as an important peacekeeping facet on the international stage.
Hegemonic stability theory argues that a clear dominant state
provides both economic and political stability worldwide1.
Providing stability is a key function for a hegemonic state. This
stability often comes in the form of a dominant military, as well
as a strong economy, in order to maintain hegemonic status for
a prolonged period. Without a hegemonic military power such
as the United States, hegemonic stability theory suggests that
maintaining global peace would be more difficult without a
single dominant state establishing and maintaining order in the
international system1.
A hegemon comes into existence when a single power holds
a higher sum of various measures of power over other states and
actors. The factors used in this paper for hegemonic measurements
consisted of forms of economic, diplomatic, and military capabilities.
To measure hard power, the units of measurement were standing
army size, military spending, and technological advancements. To
measure economic and soft power, Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
GDP per-capita, and stock market health were used to measure the
economic and militaristic capabilities of a state. A macro evaluation
of any state’s health and relative power can be seen through these
factors. With these measurements taken into account, a state can be
evaluated to determine if it has reached a hegemonic status.
Joseph Nye’s interpretation of soft power refers to a
state’s ability to use diplomatic persuasion and mutual interest
to build power2. Transnational actors have greatly impacted
state development, especially through economics. Transnational
corporations, such as Apple, have the ability to transform an entire
country’s economy, as seen in the economic development of Ireland
since Apple’s arrival in the 1980’s3.
One soft power measure is the influence a state has in
the United Nations (UN), a large part of the intergovernmental
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system. The UN holds a unique ability in that it is able to provide
humanitarian aid as well as deploy any of its voluntary forces to
perform peace operations (including coercive enforcement, if
authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter)4. In the UN Charter, the ability to veto resolutions put
forth by any member is given to the five permanent members of the
Security Council, which includes China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The ability to veto any resolution
grants these states the ability to influence world politics in a way
no non-member state is able to achieve4. The structure of the UN
provides an opportunity for states to deliberate issues and assist
other states through a participatory format in which each state has
one vote in the General Assembly. Much of the UN’s success has
been credited to its structural effectiveness, according to an article
in The International Journal of Peace Studies, which concludes that
active participation and direct involvement in peace efforts have a
profound effect on the UN’s overall success5.
China’s economic and diplomatic initiatives in Africa in
recent years illustrate the exercise of soft power. Efforts by China
to increase its geopolitical power have seen the state expand trade
into Africa significantly, with over $100 billion loaned to African
countries in the last 15 years alone, according to data from the
China African Research Initiative6. As investment opportunities
have dwindled inside its borders, China has sought increased
investment internationally. China has also been a 21st century
investor in countries with weaker governments. This strategy
could be explained by a soft power tradeoff of financial risk for
geopolitical advantages. By investing large sums of money in
multiple important infrastructure and development efforts, China
has gained influence while building strong relationships with all
of the recipients of its funds. Over a billion people live on the
continent of Africa, and the 54 states of the continent represent
over one-quarter of the votes in the UN General Assembly. A
concentrated expansion effort by China could provide both
economic and political leverage, should a conflict arise between
hegemonic contenders. The loans made to Algeria, Kenya, and
Nigeria have provided China with strategic access to ports
throughout the African continent. In addition to the hard power
advantages provided by port use, the gain in soft power through
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trade deals provides a point of leverage for China in its quest for
hegemonic power.
China has also deepened its economic relationships with
African countries in an effort to gain access to raw materials
and to create new markets for Chinese goods and services. The
economic value from improved African-Chinese relations can be
observed in their arms dealings, with China accounting for 25%
of conventional arms sales to the continent7. China’s permanent
seat on the UN Security Council affords it a unique opportunity
to serve as a useful ally with developing African nations on
the international stage. The African continent’s development
potentially provides China a large untapped market of both
economic and political value.
In addition to increasing their presence in Africa, China’s
Belt and Road Initiative aims to expand Chinese influence and
connectivity throughout Europe26. This plan was created with
the hope of expanding Chinese trade while providing China with
easier access to European markets. Expanding geopolitical power
through economic projects will give China significant influence
over the political activities of indebted states. The plans for this
initiative include building special economic zones and expanding
the use of Chinese currency26.
The rise of an industrialized power with cyber security
expertise, such as China, calls into question the perceived hegemonic
status of the United States. For decades, the United States has been
viewed as the major dominant power across the globe in terms of
international influence. If China expands and strengthens its ties
with a larger number of developing countries, it could become just
as important a geopolitical ally to the continent of Africa as the U.S.
has been in the past. In order for the soft power established by the
U.S. in Africa to be truly threatened, the loans made by China to
African nations must result in the continent’s economic growth
and stability. If these states were unable to repay their loans, China’s
loss of capital would be detrimental both to China and to the future
economic health of the African continent.
Hard power remains important, but technology has altered
some of its characteristics. With the destructive power of nuclear
weapons, as well as the prohibitions against their use, this paper
measures a state’s hard power in terms of its advancements in
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the acquisition of military armaments and the size of its standing
army. The ability of a state to use significant funds for its military
demonstrates a commitment to military advancement, whereas a
large volume of armed forces demonstrates another use of human
capital, stemming from the state’s commitment to the military. The
United States has led all other states in military spending, with
an approved 2019 military budget of over $650 billion8. The 2017
military budget of the United States was $610 billion, which is
the size of the combined military budgets of China, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, India, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom9. Though the
United States far outspends other states, Russia and China still spend
a considerable amount on their military. China is the sole nation to
rival the U.S. in military spending, with just over $228.2 billion spent
in 2017. This is a very significant amount when compared to the
military spending of other hegemonic contenders, such as Russia,
which spent $66 billion in 201710. In ranking the largest standing
armies in the world, China’s army is largest, while the U.S. ranks
third, and Russia is fifth11. Of the five permanent Security Council
members, only three states on the UN Security Council have large
standing armies in addition to high military investment, when
compared to total GDP and worldwide state military spending.
A nation’s hegemonic solidification can be measured by
the health of its stock market in addition to other economic factors,
such as GDP and GDP per capita. In 2017, the United States held a
$7 trillion annual GDP lead over China and surpassed the Russian
Federation’s GDP by over $17 trillion12. The United States also holds
a significant positive gap between competitors in GDP per capita,
which at $59,531, was considerably higher than Russia’s $10,743 and
China’s per-capita GDP of $8,826.9913.
Using hegemonic contenders’ stock markets as a measure
of economic health, a macro view of a state’s general health and
sector growth may be analyzed. From February 1, 2009 to February
1, 2019, the United States’ stock market, as measured by the S&P
500, increased over 377%, with companies such as Facebook and
Exxon Mobil having produced double-digit year-to-date returns14.
The Moscow Exchange, or MOEX, is the index used to track 50
companies in Russia as a measure of Russian economic health.
Similar to the growth of the S&P 500, from January 1, 2009 to January
1, 2019, the MOEX index increased over 380%15. Though both the
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S&P 500 and MOEX markets saw similar increases in percentages,
these numbers differ due to the S&P 500’s market cap of $250 billion,
while the MOEX’s market cap is close to $160 billion15. The growth
of the S&P 500 was largely due to the amount of total capital dictated
by the market cap. The Russian Federation’s heavy dependence on
oil prices plays a significant role in the MOEX index, with energy
corporations, such as Gazprom, contributing heavily to the Russian
Federation’s current economic boom.
The United States’ strong economic performance, large
active standing military, and extensive international soft power
argues for its position as the current hegemon of the world. With the
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, China and the Russian Federation
have emerged as the two major hegemonic challengers to the United
States. For the past three decades, these states have competed with
the U.S. for geopolitical power and hegemonic superiority.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the development of technological infrastructure, the
digital world has become a platform for business, communication,
and military power. Similar to insurance for a home, proper cyber
security is crucial for all digital consumers, from individuals to
governmental agencies. Cyber and information warfare come
in a variety of forms and can be executed through a plethora of
technological entry points. Cyber warfare is defined by RAND
as, “the actions by a nation-state of international organization
to attack and attempt to damage another nation’s computers or
information networks through, for example, computer viruses
or denial-of-service attacks”16. Information warfare is more
commonly associated with the use of misinformation, which is
currently commonly seen on social media platforms. In countries
with a high volume of technology, such as laptops or smartphones,
the magnitude of a cyber attack on digital infrastructure poses the
threat of financial losses as well as disruptions in communication.
China currently holds the greatest cyber warfare ability,
as well as the most experience in all of Asia, with the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) of China being estimated to have conducted
over 200 different information warfare military exercises from the
late 1990s to 201017. In information warfare exercises held by the
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PLA, the use of Trojan horse viruses disguised as Microsoft Word
and PowerPoint were installed in government office computers in
several countries17. Once a file was saved on an infected computer,
the information the file contained was uploaded to several Beijingbased websites in which the saved documents were stored17.
Developments in China’s cyber arsenal include software capable
of obtaining passwords, code breaking, information-deception
software, and other forms of malware. These methods have been
tested, starting in 2000, and have since been developed into detailed
procedures used by the PLA in other military procedures17. The
online infrastructure of the world includes social media and other
platforms in which information, goods, or services are exchanged.
Any attacks on such infrastructure can cause problems ranging
from financial losses due to unavailable banking services to
widespread panic created by the spread of misinformation.
The use of misinformation is another sector of information
warfare that can impact populations through quick information
dissemination. The use of misinformation has reached a level of
development proven to influence domestic and international
politics. During the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, the use of “fake
news” on social media became a form of information warfare. A
study in The Journal of Economic Perspectives reported that fake
news stories concerning the election were shared over 150 million
times18. The source of the fake news differed, depending on
whether the fake news websites aimed to earn a profit or primarily
hoped to influence the opinions of others.
In cyberspace, information can be quickly spread, regardless
of accuracy. Using popular keywords or “tags,” a properly positioned
story can become “viral” and spread information to a large number
of people. The use of misinformation is not a new concept, but it
has taken on a new and wider platform via the internet. Setting
up accounts on a variety of platforms is a simple task that often
only requires email verification. The potential impact that a fake
newspaper article may have, compared to the potential of the same
article on a social media site, such as Facebook or Instagram, greatly
differs due the speed and range of readers the story may reach.
Regardless of the spectrum of the information attack, the security of
the digital infrastructure of a state is crucial to its structural integrity
and the flow of information in and out of its borders.
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Gaining an upper hand in the use of technology could
prove to be a significant advantage, should any form of conflict
break out between states. These attacks can also be perpetrated
by non-state actors, which can have unclear identities. With the
historical tensions between Russia and the United States, the
notion of a cyber war between states would not be unreasonable.
Due to the damage to infrastructure and human life caused by the
use of nuclear weapons, a more sustainable form of conflict might
be one waged without troops and with none of the costs of war.
The ease of deniability related to cyber attacks could also make
the proxy use of non-state actors an effective means of interstate
conflict; the use of non-state actors in cyber attacks could be
beneficial to a larger state as a means of disguising attacks.
Often, terrorist groups hope to spread their message to
the widest audience possible. The internet provides a medium
in which content can be freely posted and distributed, with few
general regulations put in place by states. “Netwar” is a term used to
describe a brand of war based on the use of information warfare19.
In this style of warfare, the aggressive use of information systems
siphons power from states to non-state actors. States have hard
boundaries are not able to encroach on other states’ territories.
Through the internet, non-state actors have the means to recruit
inside national borders while spreading propaganda.
The complexity of cyber attacks often causes significant
issues when nations seek to develop a protocol to deal with them.
In the spread of misinformation, whatever is posted can easily be
screenshot and reposted, making it difficult to stop its spread. The
global influence of terrorist networks, transnational corporations,
and transnational criminal organizations poses a challenge to the
power of the state19.
Without proper measures for adequate security, a rogue
attack on a transport or communication system could prove to be
dangerous, as well as difficult to trace. The spread of Trojan horse
viruses can be used to quickly infect and take over computers, in
an age in which privacy policies and terms of services are often too
dense to be thoroughly read by the average user. With the ease of
misinformation dissemination, non-state actors have the ability to
mobilize quickly, which poses a threat to security protocols that
may not be adequately prepared for these sorts of strikes, due to
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their unpredictability in form and timing. For the country facing
the cyber attack, a reactionary response to a cyber attack could
mean the loss of a large volume of e-commerce.
The security of cyberspace has direct effects on the
outside world in a variety of ways. In the turmoil occurring from
the denial of services such as water or electricity, a functioning
society could come to a standstill. Without proper information
services, people may be left without direction during times of
need or in evacuation situations. Preparedness for the dangers
of an event, such as a wide scale attack on digital infrastructure,
should be met with carefully conceived protocols detailing
procedures for the timely and accurate spread of relevant
information. In addition to proper information dispersal, stores
of food and water should be held by local governments to address
a shortage of goods.
In 2007, the state of Estonia fell victim to a range of
cyber attacks on its online infrastructure by a group of Russian
hackers21. This attack was fueled by the tension between the
two states, which reached a boiling point in 2007 over the
relocation of a statue. After the statue was moved, Estonia was
hit with denial-of-service attacks for 22 days, and, as a result,
two major banks, the websites of all government ministries, and
the websites of a few political parties were shut down21. Estonia
is viewed as a European leader in terms of the integration of
the internet in its citizens’ daily lives, making its vulnerability
to cyber crime more noteworthy. Some suggested that these
attacks were the result of the transcendence of the Russian
ethnic identity across geopolitical borders21. During the attacks,
many financial organizations kept their losses private, with
one bank only later admitting it had lost over a million dollars
during the 22 day span21. The use of the internet in banking,
communication, and voting in Estonia can be compared to the
level that citizens of the United States use in their own daily
lives. With both countries relying heavily on the digital world
for information and basic services, any attack would threaten a
major conduit for many forms of business and communications.
The level of sophistication of the Estonian cyber attacks should
serve as a warning to the United States about the importance of
high-level cyber security measures.
109

Cyril K. Yancey

The balance of power between hegemonic contenders
has been a linear race in favor of the United States in the recent
past. The introduction of cyber and information warfare offers
a chance for other nations to tip the scales militarily in favor of
either Russia or China, the two main hegemonic contenders to
the United States, offsetting their relative lag in other military
and economic power dimensions. The cyber experience of both
Russia and China poses a great risk to the continued hegemonic
power of the United States on the world stage. While a major
cyber attack comparative to Estonia has yet to be enacted on the
United States, cyber and information warfare poses a threat to the
hegemonic state of the United States. These methods, combined
with competitive economic and geopolitical performance, suggest
that China and the Russian Federation could pose serious threats
to United States’ hegemony in the 21st century.
Power Relations in the 21st Century
The 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy
summary states: “We are engaged in a long-term strategic
competition with China and Russia. These states have expanded
that competition to include persistent campaigns in and through
cyberspace that pose long-term strategic risk to the Nation as
well as to our allies and partners”24. This document notes the
erosion of military advantages of the U.S. due to the advancement
of Chinese cyber technology, which has stolen information from
both the public and private sectors24. It also states that Russian
influence in the 2016 Presidential elections was made possible by
cyber technology24. There is no anticipated end to these threats.
China, Russia, and the cyber technology developed by these states
will continue to pose a significant threat to the current balance
of power. As the number of malicious cyber events continues to
rise, the growth of cyber technology by actors who have a history
of aggressive activities poses a threat to international security.
Power relations between states have been changed by the
integration of the cyberworld into facets of daily life. Joseph Nye
predicts that governments will not be able to control cyberspace
as closely as physical spaces, such as attacks by land or sea22. He
emphasizes the roles that non-state actors will play, due to the low
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cost of cyber attacks22. The barriers that have traditionally kept
non-state actors from engaging in conflict with states, such as the
lack of armed forces or military resources, are made irrelevant
with the possession and use of offensive cyber technology. These
actors do not require the capital normally needed when launching
an offensive; in addition, states that do not have traditional
means of military or coercive power can also benefit through the
use of cyber warfare. Russia’s developments in cyber technology
make them just as significant a threat, according to the U.S.
Department of Defense, as China, a close hegemonic contender
to the U.S. These factors argue for the need for increased funding
to programs regarding cyber security issues.
As cyberspace expands its reach, the strength of a state’s
cyber defenses and technological advancement could become a
more accurate measure of 21st century military capabilities, due
to the range of cyberattacks20. The United States, as the current
hegemon, has the most to lose by such a reassessment of power.
The inclusion of cyber capabilities in military preparedness has
the potential to shift the current measures of power, greatly
changing the hegemonic competition in favor of China. States
that may not have traditional measures of power, such as a large
standing army or high military spending, could gain power
through their development of cyber technology, as well as by
developing relationships with non-state actors.
In order to prevent a major security attack such as that
experienced in Estonia, laws and principles must be established
to create and maintain order among digital consumers.
Establishment of these policies should target different forms of
cybercrime and create guidelines for internet use within state
borders. The International Governance Forum held by the UN
focused on cybercrime, with topics including how to combat fake
news and other dangers in cyberspace. The intended outcomes of
the forum were to provide strategies to better protect international
cyberspace, limiting the potential sources of cybercrime25. States
could voluntarily agree to participate in these agreements as they
see fit for their constituents, with the option to opt in and out of
treaties and agreements. As the structure of the internet grows to
accommodate its increasing base of users, the way cyberspace is
treated should also reflect its size and stature. The internet is used
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by a majority of citizens in the nations in which it is available,
and establishing safety standards for its use are critical.
Governing the internet could be done in the form of a
UN-style council. In a forum such as this, states could have the
ability to contribute to the rules affecting this arena of world
power. This would then provide states that hold significant activity
in cyberspace, in addition to those that aim to become more
engaged, with a way to set international rules that are universally
agreed upon and reflect fairness. With the establishment of
global cyber rules, the supervision of the use of cyber technology
in state borders could become more transparent. The use of nonstate actors to carry out proxy cybercrimes for states could be
lessened with higher accountability on the use of cyberspace
between state borders.
The rise of “hacktivism,” or hacking for the sake of
political influence in the late 20th and early 21st centuries,
demonstrates a need for these rules. The influential weight a
single actor has on the world stage can greatly influence entire
governments and organizations. “Sit-ins” on websites refer to
an instance when a mass number of users log on to a website,
crowding the server and potentially causing the server to shut
down or experience any number of technological problems19.
With the addition of “bot networks,” a single person can lead a
sit-in, influencing network access for thousands. In addition to
cyber sit-in power, gaining visibility is often an important part
for hacktivists and cyber attacks. Web defacements are used as a
means of gaining notoriety as well as spreading a message. As the
sophistication of cyber attacks develops, these defacements could
become ways to disseminate false information through official
government websites. An example of defacements would be the
Chinese hackers who hacked Taiwanese websites, displaying proChina messages19.
The user-base of the internet has risen to over two billion,
giving information and cyber warfare the potential to become
the most dangerous and mobilized weapon of the 21st century.
As the number of active internet users increases, the internet
becomes an avenue in which states and non-state actors can
increase their economic and diplomatic prowess through strategic
and targeted manipulation of web content. The manipulation
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of information provides a method for non-state actors to bribe
states or individuals, accruing funds for their organizations, often
by clandestine means. Non-state actors are not subject to states’
laws and can perform violent and harmful acts that would elicit
a strong retaliatory response if attempted in domestic settings.
Since non-state actors do not work inside territorial boundaries,
tracking them can prove a difficult task, resulting in the prolonged
anonymity of sophisticated cyber criminals.
The hegemonic status of the United States has been
solidified through its military advantages, GDP, and other means
of keeping pace with world competitors. Through diplomacy and
geopolitics, the United States has built a network of economic
relationships, as well as political allies, to secure its physical and
economic security. China has aimed to build its own network of
partnerships throughout the world, in recent decades particularly
within the continent of Africa. In building these networks and
growing its geopolitical power, China aims to eventually become
the hegemon of the international system. China is challenging
the United States in its development of cyber technology and
use of cyber warfare technology, a new measure of power that
can undermine former units of hard power measurement. Large
amounts of GDP spending used for the development of nuclear
and other traditional forms of hard power could be completely
wasted, should cyber warfare overtake them in practicality in
this century. In addition to the efforts of hegemonic contention
by China, Russia’s development and willingness to use cyber
arms adds an additional threat to the overall national security
of the United States, as well as the cyber infrastructure of the
world. Proper measures must be considered to ensure that the
online infrastructure of the world is properly protected, while
also protecting the sovereignty of the state. While states must
have the ability to create their own regulation concerning internet
use, the lack of territorial boundaries in the cyberworld call for a
rethinking of the boundaries of information use and cybercrime.
The primary threat to the United States’ hegemony comes
in the form of cyberspace, with Russia and China benefiting
through the lack of rules and punishment, as shown by their
multiple incidents of political cyber interference in other states.
As the United States aims to conserve its position as a hegemon,
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proper defensive cyber technology is crucial. Measures of hard and
soft power indicate that the United States possesses the capabilities
to resist any form of land, sea, or air assault. While these are
important measures of defense, in order to secure and protect its
hegemonic status, the United States must focus on cyberspace as
its next frontier. With such an open and vulnerable landscape,
cyberspace is the most likely target for Russia and China to erode
American hegemonic status.
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